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Paula Schaefer

Protecting a Business Entity Client from Itself
Through Loyal Disclosure
Many attorneys are unaware of or misunderstand an important tool they
can use to protect their business organization clients: the ability to disclose the
client’s confidences. In jurisdictions with “loyal disclosure” rules—rules
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Bar
Association in response to Enron and other corporate scandals—counsel may
disclose confidential information to protect an entity client from the harmful,
illegal conduct of company constituents. In this essay, I explain that an entity
client has an interest in its attorneys understanding these complicated rules
and, when appropriate, disclosing confidences to protect the organization from
the financial consequences of constituent misconduct.
In contrast to adverse disclosure rules that allow attorneys to divulge
confidences to protect a third party or the lawyer,1 loyal disclosure rules permit
counsel to disclose confidences to protect the entity client itself. The text of
loyal disclosure rules is complex, but these rules essentially provide that
disclosure is permitted if counsel is certain that constituents are engaged in
illegal conduct and reasonably believes substantial injury to the organization
can be averted through disclosure.2 Imagine that an attorney represents Renron
Corporation. Renron’s managers are breaching their fiduciary duties to the
corporation. They are defrauding the investing public. Counsel knows that if
the managers are not stopped the company will suffer substantial financial
injury. Counsel has presented these concerns to a committee of disinterested
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) & cmts. 6-15 (2003).
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i) & (iii) (2008); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c)
(2003). Twenty-four states have adopted Model Rule 1.13(c) or a substantially similar
provision.
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directors, but the directors refuse to act. Loyal disclosure rules permit counsel
to reveal otherwise confidential information to save Renron.
While there is some logic in this loyal disclosure scenario, it highlights a
number of practical problems with the rules. I can easily create a fictitious
lawyer who knows with certainty that his or her business client’s constituents
are engaged in illegal conduct that will harm the company. But it is much more
difficult for a real lawyer, looking at isolated facts in the present, to draw such
conclusions. Lawyers may believe determinations of “fraud” and “breach of
fiduciary duty” should only be made by juries (after months of testimony that
follow years of discovery) and not by lawyers. Further, in the Renron example,
I simply assume that disclosure could have saved the company. In practice,
however, it may be hard to conceive that divulging client confidences (to the
SEC, for example) would be in the client’s interest. In sum, a lawyer faces a
difficult task when considering loyal disclosure. Not only must the lawyer
determine if he or she has the requisite certainty that the entity client’s business
conduct is illegal and likely to injure the company, but he or she also must
determine whether disclosure will protect rather than harm the client.
Given the difficulty of reaching such conclusions, attorneys may be relieved
to learn that the SEC and ABA loyal disclosure rules provide that attorneys
“may” (but not “shall”) disclose confidences to protect the entity client.3 Some
lawyers may conclude that the question of loyal disclosure can be avoided by
exercising this discretion to maintain the business client’s confidences.
Nonetheless, lawyers should not dismiss loyal disclosure rules as
impossibly complex or as merely permissive. Attorneys have ethical and legal
obligations as fiduciaries to act in the best interest of their entity clients when
client constituents are engaged in illegal conduct. Counsel should be guided by
two principles in this regard. First, the attorney’s duty is to the entity.4 Second,
it is in the entity’s best interest to avoid financial injury arising from
constituent misconduct.5 Attorneys have faced civil liability for not protecting
their organizational clients from such misconduct.6 Before the promulgation of
loyal disclosure rules, attorneys were barred from taking protective measures
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17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i) & (iii); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003).
See George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure To
Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 600 (1998).
See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of
Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 736-37 (2004).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. f (2000) (citing cases
where attorneys were held liable for not taking steps to protect organizational clients from
wrongful conduct of constituents).
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that would violate the duty of confidentiality.7 But in jurisdictions that have
removed this prohibition by adopting loyal disclosure rules, a fiduciary should
no longer err on the side of confidentiality but must instead critically analyze
his or her client’s interest in disclosure.
When an attorney is concerned that company constituents are engaged in
illegal activity, there is an important prerequisite to loyal disclosure: “up the
ladder” reporting. Up the ladder reporting rules require counsel to report
evidence of illegal conduct to increasingly higher levels of authority in the
organization, including if necessary, the organization’s highest authority.8
These rules broadly define the types of illegal conduct that a company’s
attorney must report,9 thus inviting lawyers to scrutinize company conduct for
fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, securities law violations, and similar
transgressions. Attorneys who endeavor to make these tough determinations
and take their conclusions up the ladder will provide their clients with the
advice needed to correct misconduct and avoid financial injury.
When the company’s highest authority fails or refuses to respond
appropriately to up the ladder reporting, a lawyer should evaluate the propriety
of loyal disclosure. Under the loyal disclosure rules, counsel must have a high
level of certainty that the conduct is illegal.10 Such certainty may be present in
cases where the material facts are not in dispute (as when client constituents
have made admissions to counsel) or when only one reasonable conclusion can
be drawn from the facts known to counsel. Attorneys must then consider
whether they reasonably believe disclosure to someone could protect the client
from substantial financial injury, such as by preventing future illegal conduct.
While the SEC rule only allows disclosure to the SEC, the ABA rule does not
limit the recipients of loyal disclosure.11 In jurisdictions that follow the ABA
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Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate
Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 289 (1987).
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b), (c) (2008) (explaining the duty to report “evidence of a material
violation” to higher authorities in the corporation, and defining the company’s highest
authority for such a report as the audit committee, a committee of disinterested directors, or
a qualified legal compliance committee); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b)
(2003) (describing an attorney’s duty to report to higher authorities, and if necessary to the
organization’s “highest authority,” when the attorney “knows” that a constituent is engaged
in a legal violation to the organization or a legal violation that might be imputed to the
organization).
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2008); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2003).
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i) & (iii) (2008) (allowing loyal disclosure of a “material violation”
and not “evidence” of a material violation); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c)
(2003) (permitting loyal disclosure of conduct that is “clearly a violation of law”).
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i) & (iii) (providing for disclosure “to the Commission”); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2003).
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rule, an obvious candidate for loyal disclosure is a nonmanagement owner: a
partner, limited partner, member, or shareholder who otherwise would be
unaware of the conduct in question.12 An owner may be able to spur
management to action when the company’s lawyer could not.
If counsel determines loyal disclosure is appropriate to protect the
organization from substantial injury, counsel should explain this conclusion to
the company’s highest authority—the same individuals who received the
lawyer’s up the ladder report. Counsel’s suggestion of imminent loyal
disclosure will likely create an adversarial relationship between these managers
and counsel. And perhaps it should. Attorneys and managers are adversaries
when managers refuse to address counsel’s report that constituents are
engaged in illegal conduct that will harm the company’s financial interests.
Decisions that create legal liability for the organization are not “business
decisions,” and lawyers should not defer to managers on these matters.13 In
jurisdictions that prohibit loyal disclosure, counsel has no option other than
resignation if managers do not take corrective action. On the other hand, when
counsel has the ability to take the additional step of disclosure, company
decisionmakers may be more inclined to correct illegal conduct, obviating the
need for disclosure.14 Under either scenario—lawyer disclosure or corrective
conduct by managers—the organization will be better protected from the
adverse financial consequences of illegal constituent conduct.
Paula Schaefer is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee
College of Law.
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